Open access: Most of my publications are now available open access here:

Progress in science and philosophy (since 2019): I’m the Co-Investigator of the project “Understanding Progress, in Science and Beyond”, which is generously funded by the Icelandic Research Fund. The main objectives of this project are (i) to develop and evaluate a novel understanding-based account of scientific progress, and (ii) to explore the prospects for extending this account to philosophical progress. For more details see here.


  1. Dellsén, F., Lawler, I, Norton, J. (online first). Thinking about Progress: From Science to Philosophy. Noûs.

Measurement in cognitive science (since 2019): I’m interested in the nature, validation, and development of measurement techniques in cognitive science. I focus on more experimentally based measures, such as eye-tracking and neurological measures. Another emphasis will be the relation between indirect measurement and robust inferences based on direct measurement.

  • In June 2019, I hosted a first workshop on this topic together with Edouard Machery, featuring both philosophers of science and cognitive scientists as speakers.


  1. June 2019: Measurement in Neurolinguistics: The Case of the N400 effect. Workshop “Measurement in cognitive science”. Ruhr University Bochum.

Applied statistical reasoning (since 2015): I’m primarily concerned with statistical hypothesis testing. One sub-project is to examine the relationship between research hypotheses and corresponding statistical hypotheses. Future sub-projects are to analyze the justificatory role of statistical values in hypothesis testing, such as the widely contested p-value, and to explore the connection between the so-called replication crisis and statistical hypothesis testing.

  • From October 2017 until the end of March 2018, I worked on this project at the University of Salzburg (host: Charlotte Werndl; financially sponsored by an Ernst Mach visiting research fellowship from the OeAD).


  1. Lawler, I., Zimmermann, G. (2021). Misalignment between research hypotheses and statistical hypotheses – A threat to evidence-based medicine? Topoi, 40(2), pp. 307-318. (online first: 2019)


  1. July 2019: Misalignment between research hypotheses and statistical hypotheses – A threat to evidence-based medicine? [with G. Zimmermann]. Conference “Statistical Reasoning and Scientific Error”; Munich.
  2. June 2019: Misalignment between research hypotheses and statistical hypotheses – A threat to evidence-based medicine? [with G. Zimmermann]. 8th International Philosophy of Medicine Roundtable; Paris.
  3. May 2019: Misalignment between research hypotheses and statistical hypotheses – A threat to evidence-based medicine? [with G. Zimmermann]. Workshop “Philosophical Perspectives on Medical Knowledge”; Genoa, Italy.
  4. January 2018: What precisely is the epistemic issue regarding null hypothesis significance testing? Work in Progress Seminar. University of Salzburg.
  5. April 2015: Does statistical null hypothesis significance testing provide knowledge? Third Meeting of the Nordic Network for Philosophy of Science; Helsinki.

Explanatory knowledge and understanding (since 2014): Knowing why things are the case is an important epistemic achievement. My doctoral thesis, Knowing why – an investigation of explanatory knowledge (2018), offers an analysis of knowing why based on inquiry into the nature of why-questions and their answers, as well as into the nature of knowledge and concealed questions, such as knowing when the train comes. I’m also concerned with reductionism about understanding why and the factivity of scientific understanding, i.e., with the question whether understanding why is simply knowing why, and the question whether scientific understanding can involve falsehoods. Regarding the former, I am steering a middle course between reductionism, according to which understanding why reduces to knowing why, and anti-reductionism. I make the case for what I dub modest and parsimonious reductionism, according to which understanding why reduces to what I below called ‘non-shallow’ knowing why. Apart from developing this account, I defend the claim that scientific understanding why is factive in light of model-based understanding, based on my work on model-based knowing why. I argue that successful scientific idealizations are not part of the propositional content of one’s understanding (which would render the content partially false). Instead, they only provide us with an epistemic access to explanatorily relevant features.

  • From May 2014 until March 2018, I worked on this project as a predoctoral researcher on the Volkswagen Foundation project “A study in explanatory power”.
  • From October 2015 until the end of March 2016, I did research at NYU in the research center “Varieties of Understanding” under the supervision of Michael Strevens and Catherine Elgin in order to deepen my studies.
  • April & May 2017, I did research at the University of Edinburgh under the supervision of Duncan Pritchard.


  1. Lawler, I. (2021). Scientific understanding and felicitous legitimate falsehoods. Synthese, 198(7), pp. 6859-6887. (online first: 2019)
  2. Lawler, I., Sullivan, E. (2020, online first). Model explanation vs. model-induced explanation. Foundations of Science. DOI: 10.1007/s10699-020-09649-1
  3. Lawler, I. (2019b). Understanding why, knowing why, and cognitive achievementsSynthese,196(11), pp. 4583-4603. (online first: 2018)
  4. Lawler, I. (2019a). Levels of reasons why and answers to why-questions. Philosophy of Science, 86(1), pp. 168-177
  5. Lawler, I. (2016). Reductionism about understanding whyProceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 116 (2), pp. 229-236. DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aow007


  1. February 2019: Scientific understanding and felicitous falsehoods. University of North Carolina, Greensboro.
  2. February 2019: Understanding based on distorted models and toy models – Towards a unified account. Workshop on scientific understanding and representation. University of Bordeaux-Montaigne.
  3. November 2018: Knowing why and gradability. University of Hamburg.
  4. October 2018: Knowing why and gradability. Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.
  5. October 2018:Understanding why and answers to why-questions. Workshop on the varieties of relevance. University of Hamburg.
  6. July 2018: Knowing why and gradability. European Epistemology Network Meeting 2018; Amsterdam.
  7. June 2018: Understanding why and answers to why-questions. Models of Explanation; Turin.
  8. May 2018: Understanding in the case of holistically distorted models and how-possibly models  –  A unified account. Workshop “Explanation and understanding”; Ghent.
  9. March 2018: Felicitous falsehoods from a factivist point of view. Symposium on C. Elgin’s monograph “True enough”. University of Innsbruck.
  10. February 2018: Knowing why – Depth & Gradability. Vienna Colloquium Analytic Philosophy. University of Vienna.  (canceled because of illness)
  11. November 2017: Reduktionismus bezüglich Verstehen-warum im Lichte der Mehrstufigkeit von Gründen. Workshop on knowing, understanding, and explaining. TU Dresden.
  12. September 2017: Ist Wissen-warum gradierbar? XXIV. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie; Berlin.
  13. July 2017: Knowing why and explanatory knowing how. Workshop “The varieties of knowing how”. University of Duisburg-Essen.
  14. February 2017: Lässt sich Verstehen-warum auf Wissen-warum reduzieren? TU Dresden.
  15. December 2016: Explanatory knowledge and the idealization challenge from model-based explanations. Research colloquium “Logic and epistemology”. Ruhr-University Bochum.
  16. November 2016: How do idealizing models provide understanding-why? Twenty-Fifth Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association (PSA 2016); Atlanta.
  17. July 2016: Knowing-why. European Epistemology Network Meeting 2016; Paris.
  18. May 2016: How do model-based explanations provide understanding-why? Workshop “Explanation and understanding”; Aarhus.
  19. May 2016: (How) Do models provide understanding-why? Models and simulations 7; Barcelona.
  20. May 2016: Wissen und explanatorisches Verstehen. TU Darmstadt.
  21. April 2016: How do idealizing models provide understanding-why? Fourth Meeting of the Nordic Network for Philosophy of Science; Pärnu.
  22. March 2016: The epistemic value of scientific idealizations for understanding-why. “Values in science” University of Washington graduate student conference; Seattle.
  23. September 2015: Knowledge-why revisited. GAP 9; Osnabrück.
  24. May 2015: Knowledge and understanding-why. Osnabrücker Philosophie-Kolloquium. University of Osnabrück.


Non-declarative sentences and intensional semantics (since 2013): The meaning of declarative sentences  (e.g., “The cat is on the mat.”) is typically analyzed in terms of their truth conditions. Intuitively, the meaning of non-declarative sentences (e.g., “Is the cat on the mat?” or “Put the cat on the mat!”) cannot be analyzed in this way. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to strive for a unified semantic. A common semantic framework for all kinds of sentences would accommodate the thought that sub-sentential expressions have the same meaning in all kinds of sentences, and it could deal with so-called mixed-mood sentences in which different kinds of sentences are combined (e. g., If you put me on the mat, then where do you put the cat?).  In my Master thesis, Non-declarative sentences and internsional semantics — A shotgun wedding? (2014), I examined two proposals of how to obtain such a framework by employing tools from intensional semantics. The first stems from David Lewis (“General Semantics”, 1970) and the second from Roland Hausser (esp. “Surface Compositional Grammar”, 1980). Lewis’ basic idea is that non-declaratives are syntactic variants of certain explicit performatives (“Do you love me?” vs. “I ask you whether you love me”). Since the latter arguably have truth conditions, non-declaratives have them, too. Their syntactic surfaces differ but not their semantics. This idea is plausible in light of the fact that such variants are both used to achieve the same communicative goal (e.g., to ask the addressee whether she loves the language user). Nonetheless, Lewis’ proposal has been widely rejected and never been worked out. My evaluation of the objections shows that they are not conclusive, though. Some of them arise from too simplified an interpretation of his proposal, some rely on disputable premises, and some can be rebutted. My conclusion is that Lewis’ proposal deserves to be fully worked out. Hausser’s basic idea is that non-declarative sentences do not have truth conditions but the same kind of semantic values as certain sub-sentential expressions. For instance, an imperative sentence has a similar semantics as one-place predicates; it specifies the property the addressee of the utterance is directed to achieve. While this analysis does justice to our intuitions insofar as that it does not ascribe truth conditions to non-declarative sentences, Hausser’s semantics has technical problems, some conceptual inconsistencies, and is not able to treat complex non-declarative sentences and mixed-mood sentences in its current form. My conclusion is that the idea requires a different implementation to yield a convincing proposal. So, even though both proposals are not fully satisfactory, it seems promising to integrate non-declarative sentences into an intensional semantics. The alleged shotgun wedding might turn out to be a happy one.


  1. October 2019: A shotgun wedding? Non-declarative sentences and truth-conditional theories of meaning. Agnes Scott College.
  2. June 2019: David Lewis on non-declarative sentences: Setting the record straight. Conference “David Lewis and his Place in the History of Analytic Philosophy”; Manchester, UK.
  3. February 2015: Non-declarative sentences in intensional semantics – Re-evaluating the Lewisian solutionGraduate workshop “Language and world”. University of Hamburg.
  4. September 2014: Non-declarative sentences in intensional semantics – A defense of a Lewisian solution. Venice graduate conference in philosophy; Venice.
  5. August 2014: Putting David Lewis’ analysis of non-declarative sentences back in the game. Eighth European Congress of Analytic Philosophy; Bucharest.

The pedagogy of logic and critical thinking (since 2012): I’m especially concerned with how to best teach logic to people who are not drawn to formalisms or math. Together with Daniel Milne-Plückebaum, I worked on two sub-projects (2012-2016): (i) We worked on how to teach the basics of critical thinking and philosophical logic to beginners and non-specialists in an effective manner. Our goal is to provide students with tools they can use for analyzing, understanding, criticizing, and constructing arguments beyond the classroom. (ii) We rethought classical argument taxonomies in order to gain a unified and detailed classification of arguments which treats deductively valid and deductively non-valid arguments on a par. While using concepts of deductive logic does not yield the desired outcome insofar as it results in analyzing deductively non-valid arguments too coarse-grainedly, we work on employing concepts from inductive logic to obtain a uniform treatment of both argument types and their respective subtypes.

  • From 2012 to 2014, we developed and applied a course concept for teaching how to analyze natural language argumentation using both formal and informal methods. This part of our project was supported by the project “Handwerk Philosophie” (which is sponsored by the program “Richtig Einsteigen” by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research). You can find some of our materials (in German) here:

Multi-modal meaning (since 2011): Humans do not only communicate by speech. Information can also be communicated with body postures, eye gazes, co-speech gestures, facial expressions, intonation, etc. If any of the latter accompany speech, it seems natural to assume that they build a meaning unit for the speaker and the recipient. Together with Hannes Rieser and Florian Hahn, I model such cases multi-modal from a formal semantics point of view, with an emphasis of speech-accompanying gestures. Among other things, we developed formal models for interfacing speech meaning and gestures meaning. We also took a look at the details of how speech and gestures (and their respective semantics) are aligned to each other both intra- and inter-personally in dialogues and trialogues. Part of our work was conducted in collaboration with Stefan Kopp, Kirsten Bergmann, Thies Pfeiffer, and Udo Klein. You can find some outcomes of our research here:

  • From March 2011 until June 2015 (i.e., mostly parallel to my Master studies), I worked as a predoctoral Research Fellow on the interdisciplinary project “Speech-gesture alignment” of the CRC 673 “Alignment in Communication” (based at Bielefeld University, sponsored by the DFG), which was led by Hannes Rieser (linguistics) and Stefan Kopp (computer science).


  1. Lawler, I., Hahn, F., Rieser, H. (2017). Gesture meaning needs speech meaning to denote – A case of speech-gesture meaning interaction. In: Proceedings of the Workshop “Formal approaches to the dynamics of linguistic interaction”, pp. 42-46.
  2. Hahn, F., Lawler, I., Rieser, H. (2014). First observations on a corpus of multi-modal trialogues. In: Proceedings of the 18th Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialogue, pp. 185–187.
  3. Klein, U., Rieser H., Hahn, F., Lawler, I. (2013). Abduction and parameterised semantic composition in speech-gesture integration. In: Proceedings of the 17th Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialogue, pp. 207–209.
  4. Pfeiffer, T., Hofmann, F., Hahn, F., Rieser, H., Röpke, I. (2013). Gesture semantics reconstruction based on motion capturing and complex event processing: a circular shape example. In: Proceedings of the 14th Annual Meeting of the Special Interest Group on Discourse and Dialogue, pp. 270–279.
  5. Bergmann, K., Hahn, F., Kopp, S., Rieser, H., Röpke, I. (2013). Integrating gesture meaning and verbal meaning for German verbs of motion: Theory and simulation. In: Proceedings of the Tilburg Gesture Research Meeting.
  6. Röpke, I. (2011). Watching the growth point grow. In: Proceedings of the Second Conference on Gesture and Speech in Interaction.


  1. December 2018: Co-speech iconic gestures and the cognitive penetrability of perception. Workshop on new perspectives on the cognitive penetrability of perception. University of Turin.
  2. July 2017: Gesture meaning needs speech meaning to denote – A case of speech-gesture meaning interaction  [with F. Hahn & H. Rieser]. ESSLLI 2017-Workshop “Formal approaches to the dynamics of linguistic interaction”; Toulouse.
  3. June 2017: How to semantically interpret co-speech iconic gestures – A process algebra approachResearch colloquium “Philosophy meets cognitive science”. Ruhr University Bochum.
  4. December 2016: Multi-modal context-dependency [with F. Hahn & H. Rieser]. Situations, Information, and Semantic Content; München. [Poster talk]
  5. September 2016: A formal semantics for iconic gestures. Graduate seminar “Meaning in speech, sign and gestures”. Department of Linguistics. New York University.
  6. December 2014: Putting the notion of context-free gesture meaning to test [with F. Hahn & H. Rieser]. Workshop “Embodied meaning goes public”; Stuttgart.
  7. September 2014: First observations on a corpus of multi-modal trialogues [with F. Hahn & H. Rieser]. The 18th Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialogue; Edinburgh. [Poster talk]
  8. July 2014: Speech-gesture-interface constructions for gestures accompanying German verb phrases [with F. Hahn & H. Rieser]. 6th Conference of the International Society for Gesture Studies; San Diego.
  9. December 2013: Abduction and parameterised semantic composition in speech-gesture integration [with U. Klein, H. Rieser & F. Hahn]. The 17th Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialogue; Amsterdam. [Poster talk]
  10. November 2013: Das Bielefelder Speech and Gesture Alignment Korpus: SaGA. Institut für Linguistik/Germanistik, University of Stuttgart [together with F. Hahn].
  11. October 2013: Using parameterised semantics for speech-gesture integration [with U. Klein, H. Rieser & F. Hahn]. Investigating semantics. Empirical and philosophical approaches; Bochum.
  12. October 2013: The Bielefeld Speech and Gesture Alignment Corpus. Zentrum für Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft (ZAS); Berlin [together with F. Hahn & H. Rieser].
  13. August 2013: Gesture semantics reconstruction based on motion capturing and complex event processing: a circular shape example [with Th. Pfeiffer, F. Hofmann, F. Hahn & H. Rieser]. The 14th Annual Meeting of the Special Interest Group on Discourse and Dialogue; Metz. [Poster talk]
  14. June 2013: Integrating gesture meaning and verbal meaning for German verbs of motion: Theory and simulation [with K. Bergmann, F. Hahn, St. Kopp & H. Rieser]. The Tilburg gesture research meeting; Tilburg. [Poster talk]
  15. March 2013: Interface constructions for gestures accompanying verb phrases [with F. Hahn & H. Rieser]. The 35th Annual Conference of the German Linguistic Society; Potsdam.
  16. September 2011: Watching the growth point grow. Gesture and speech in interaction 2011; Bielefeld.